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 Burton Tucker, proceeding pro se, appeals a United States Tax Court order 
granting the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) motion for summary judgment and 
allowing the IRS to proceed with a collection action.  We will affirm. 
 In 2008, Tucker filed delinquent tax returns for the years 2001 through 2004, but 
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he did not pay the liabilities owed on them.  He received a “Final Notice of Intent to 
Levy” in February 2010, in response to which he invoked his right to a Collection Due 
Process (CDP) hearing.1  See 26 U.S.C. § 6330(b).  Tucker enumerated a number of 
grounds upon which the assessment process was allegedly flawed, based generally on 
procedural and regulatory violations by the agency; for example, he claimed that no 
“valid notice[]” of levies had been served upon him, that the tax sought to be collected 
was outside of the relevant limitations period, and that the failure to notify him within 
sixty days of the assessment process rendered “the entire IRS tax assessment and 
collection procedure a nullity.”  Tucker also asserted his belief that there were “no
                                                 
1  A CDP hearing allows “a taxpayer to challenge the propriety of a pending tax lien or 
levy, to verify that a collection action against him is appropriate under the law, and to 
offer alternatives” to the proposed collection action.  Tucker v. Comm’r, 676 F.3d 1129, 
1131 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (no relation).  A taxpayer may also, in certain circumstances, 
challenge the underlying tax liability itself.  Id.  CDP proceedings are generally informal, 
and may comprise “informal oral and written communications between the IRS and the 
taxpayer.”  Dalton v. Comm’r, 682 F.3d 149, 155 (1st Cir. 2012).  At the end of the 
process, “the IRS is tasked with deciding whether it is reasonable to proceed with its 
intended collection action.”  Id.; see also 26 U.S.C § 6330(c)(3) (the proposed levy must 
“balance[] the need for the efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern of the 
person that any collection action be no more intrusive than necessary”).   
 signed 
4340 Form assessments” for the relevant period, based on the IRS’s failure to provide 
him with signed copies of that form.  Tucker elected to have his hearing held by 
correspondence; however, the record reflects that his subsequent communication with the 
agency was limited, as he sought to “challenge . . . the appropriateness of collection 




upon the basis for his claims.  Ultimately, the IRS issued a Notice of Determination 
concluding, essentially, that proper procedures were followed and that the “proposed levy 
[wa]s the appropriate action” to take.   
 Tucker sought review in the United States Tax Court, arguing again that IRS 
officers “ha[d] not followed their required procedures concerning income tax 
collection” and citing a substantially similar set of alleged agency missteps.  The IRS 
moved for summary judgment, which Tucker did not affirmatively oppose.  Observing 
that Tucker’s “underlying liabilities [we]re not at issue,” the Tax Court determined that: 
The record indicates that respondent’s Appeals Office considered all of 
petitioner’s contentions, verified compliance with all applicable laws and 
regulations, and considered whether the proposed collection actions 
balanced the need for efficient tax collection with petitioner’s concern that 
they be no more intrusive than necessary. We conclude that the Appeals 
Office did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the levy, and, as a result, 
respondent may proceed with collection action as determined in the notice 
of determination upon which this case is based. 
Tucker v. Comm’r
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1).  “We exercise plenary 
review of the Tax Court’s order granting the IRS’[s] summary judgment motion.”  
, T.C. Memo. 2012-30, at *6, 8 (T.C. 2012).  Tucker timely appealed. 
Hartmann v. Comm’r, 638 F.3d 248, 249 (3d Cir. 2011).  When, as here, the underlying 
tax liability is not in issue, the determination of the IRS Office of Appeals in a collection 
due process hearing is reviewed by both the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals for 
abuse of discretion.  See Kindred v. Comm’r, 454 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2006); Living 
Care Alternatives of Utica v. United States, 411 F.3d 621, 625 (6th Cir. 2005).  Under 
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this deferential standard of review, which takes into account both the informal nature of 
CDP proceedings and their limited scope, we will “set aside determinations reached by 
the IRS during the CDP process only if they are unreasonable in light of the record 
compiled before the agency.”  Dalton, 682 F.3d at 154–55.  Furthermore, judicial review 
extends only to those issues raised before the Office of Appeals.  Giamelli v. Comm’r
 As a pro se appellant, Tucker is afforded liberal construction of his filings.  
, 
129 T.C. 107, 115 (T.C. 2007). 
Becker 
v. Comm’r, 751 F.2d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 1984).  But the failure to raise an issue in an 
opening brief, even by pro se parties, renders it waived.  Eurofins Pharma US Holdings v. 
BioAlliance Pharma SA, 623 F.3d 147, 161 n.15 (3d Cir. 2010); Timson v. Sampson, 518 
F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).  Similarly, we will not review claims that 
are raised for the first time on appeal.  Becker
 Before this Court, Tucker argues one claim that he properly raised before both the 
agency and the Tax Court: he insists that deficiencies in the Form 4340s presented to him 
by the agency—specifically, their lack of signatures—rendered proceedings a nullity.  
His argument, however, appears to be premised on a misunderstanding of the relevant 
statutory and regulatory requirements.  A tax assessment must be made “in accordance 
with rules or regulations prescribed by the Secretary.”  26 U.S.C. § 6203.  Under the 
promulgated regulations: 
, 751 F.2d at 152 n.6.   
The assessment shall be made by an assessment officer signing the 
summary record of assessment.  The summary record, through supporting 
records, shall provide identification of the taxpayer, the character of the 
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liability assessed, the taxable period, if applicable, and the amount of the 
assessment.  The amount of the assessment shall, in the case of tax shown 
on a return by the taxpayer, be the amount so shown, and in all other cases 
the amount of the assessment shall be the amount shown on the supporting 
list or record.  The date of the assessment is the date the summary record is 
signed by an assessment officer. 
26 C.F.R. § 301.6203-1.  Furthermore, if a taxpayer requests a copy of this record, he is 
to be “furnished a copy of the pertinent parts of the assessment which set forth the name 
of the taxpayer, the date of assessment, the character of the liability assessed, the taxable 
period, if applicable, and the amounts assessed.”  
 Tucker’s understandable confusion likely arises from the multiple, overlapping 
documents in play.  The “Summary Record” to which the above regulation refers, and 
which must be signed and prepared in accordance with its requirements, is known as the 
Form 23C or (more recently) the Form RACS 006.  
Id. 
See March v. IRS, 335 F.3d 1186, 
1188 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Historically, the document reviewed and signed by the 
assessment officer has been Form 23C.”).  Form 4340, by contrast, is not the actual 
summary record of assessment, but instead “details the assessments made and the 
relevant date that a Summary Record of Assessment was executed.”  Id.; see also Perez v. 
United States, 312 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 2002) (distinguishing between Form 4340 and 
the RACS “Summary Record of Assessments”).  Form 4030 is, in effect, a computer 
printout reflecting the current state of assessment.  “[C]ourts have generally held that the 
IRS need not provide a taxpayer with a copy of the actual Summary Record of 
Assessment” to fulfill its obligations to the taxpayer but may instead send a Form 4340, 
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which “creates a presumption that a Summary Record of Assessment, whether on Form 
23C or RACS Report 006, was validly executed and certified.”  March, 335 F.3d. at 
1188–89; see also Gentry v. United States, 962 F.2d 555, 558 (6th Cir. 1992) (“Neither 
the Tax Code nor the Treasury Regulations require[s] those pertinent parts [furnished to 
the taxpayer] to be original documents, and the IRS has selected the certificate of 
assessments and payments as the means for providing the information specified.”).  There 
is no indication in the record that the forms provided to Tucker were actually defective or 
otherwise suspect—for example, by failing to identify the date of assessment.  See Huff 
v. United States, 10 F.3d 1440, 1446 (9th Cir. 1993).  To the extent that any signature 
was required on the Form 4340, see Taylor v. IRS, 69 F.3d 411, 419 (10th Cir. 1995),2 
the IRS introduced a signed, certified, and updated copy of the Form 4340 report in the 
proceedings before the Tax Court, and Tucker has not meaningfully challenged these 
exhibits nor explained how he was prejudiced by the initial, alleged deficiency.  See 
Roberts v. Comm’r
                                                 
2  But see Stallard v. United States, 12 F.3d 489, 493–94 (5th Cir. 1994) (suggesting that 
the signing requirement of the regulations does not apply to a “supporting record”); 
Hovind v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-143, at *13 (T.C. 2006) (collecting cases for the 
proposition that “[f]orms 4340 are not required to be signed”). 
, 329 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[A] petitioner is not 
prejudiced by having received copies of the records of assessment only after the CDP 
hearing.”).  Thus, on the record before us and before the Tax Court, we conclude that the 
IRS did not abuse its discretion by determining that it complied with the relevant statutes 
and regulations; furthermore, its “subsidiary factual and legal determinations” appear to 
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be reasonable.  Dalton
 Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the Tax 
Court. 
, 682 F.3d at 156. 
 
 
 
